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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
International Legal Standards Relating
to the Rights of Aliens and Refugees
and United States Immigration Law
Robert Kogod Goldman and Scott M. Martin
The large influx of refugees and undocumented aliens into the United States
in recent years has focused renewed public attention on the existing laws
relating to the admission, exclusion, and rights of aliens and refugees and
has led the Congress and private organizations to undertake a thorough,
ongoing review of these laws. At the same time, however, little or no atten-
tion has been paid to the rights accorded these persons under international
law, despite the fact that the worldwide refugee crisis and the plight of
undocumented aliens are among the most serious human rights problems
facing the international community today.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the basic international law stan-
dards relating to the rights of aliens and refugees, and to assess the com-
patibility of existing United States laws with those standards. The first section
of the paper briefly reviews the status of the individual under contemporary
international law and notes the'origins of the present obligation of states to
respect, on a nondiscriminatory basis, the basic human rights of all persons
in their territory. The second section identifies provisions in key international
instruments which affect the rights of aliens and refugees and, in particular,
analyzes the meaning and legal significance of the right to emigrate, the right
of asylum, and the principle of non-refoulement. The third section discusses
certain provisions in existing United States immigration law which may be
incompatible with basic international legal standards, in particular those
which conflict with provisions in conventions and other international
documents that the United States has voted for, signed, and/or ratified.
Recommended steps that the United States should undertake to harmonize
its existing and future immigration and refugee policies with its international
obligations are suggested in the conclusion of this paper.
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I. THE INDIVIDUAL AND ALIEN'S RIGHTS AS PART OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
One of the more significant aspects of international human rights law has
been the modification of the traditional international law principle which
held that states, and not individuals, are the sole and exclusive subjects of
the law of nations. According to the traditional view, a state's treatment of its
own citizens was regarded as beyond the purview of international law.1
Contemporary international law and practice, however, clearly recognize
that the individual is not only a legitimate subject, but is in fact the ultimate
object of international law. The basic goal of international human rights law,
as F. V. Garcia-Amador has written, "is to ensure the protection of the
legitimate interests of the human person, irrespective of his nationality.
Whether the person concerned is a citizen or an alien is then immaterial:
human beings, as such, are under the direct protection of international law.2
Thus, in addition to requiring a state to respect the basic human rights of
its citizens, international law today imposes an obligation on states to accord
to aliens within their jurisdiction the equal protection of these basic rights. In
this regard, the United Nations Charter, 3 which entered into force in 1945,
states in Article 55 that one of the organization's purposes, inter alia, is to
cooperate in promoting and encouraging "universal respect for, and obser-
vance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction
as to race, sex, language, or religion.4 By Article 56, all member states
"pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55."5
The term "pledge" in Article 56 has been interpreted to mean that member
states have accepted an international obligation. For example, in its 1971
opinion on Namibia, the International Court of Justice ruled that the human
rights provisions of the United Nations Charter are directly binding on
member states. 6 The principle of nondiscrimination in the protection of
1. See, e.g., L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise 362-69 (2d ed. 1912).
2. Garcia-Amador, 'Violations of Human Rights and International Responsibility," in L.
Sohn & T. Buergenthal, International Protection of Human Rights 132 (1973).
3. 1946-1947 U.N.Y.B. pt. 3, app. 1 [hereinafter cited as U.N. Charter].
4. Id. art. 55.
5. Id. art. 56.
6. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Not Withstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971
I.CJ. 16 (Advisory Opinion). The court stated:
In order to determine whether the laws and decrees applied by South Africa in Namibia... consti-
tute a violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the question of
intent or government discretion is not relevant; nor is it necessary to investigate or determine the
effects of those measures upon the welfare of the inhabitants.
Id. at 57. The court ruled that the apartheid policies of South Africa, by their terms,
violated the human rights clauses of the U.N. Charter.
Under the Charter of the United Nations, [South Africa] had pledged itself to observe and
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human rights is similarly enshrined in the 1948 Charter of the Organization
of American States. 7 Article 3(j) of Chapter I of the Charter states: "The
American States proclaim the fundamental rights of the individual without
distinction as to race, nationality, creed or sex." 8 Although neither the U.N.
nor the O.A.S. explicitly defined in its constitutive charters the basic human
rights that its respective member states undertook to respect, both organiza-
tions issued declarations in 1948 which enumerate and in large measure
provide the substantive content of those rights. These two documents are
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights9 and the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man. 10
The preamble of the Universal Declaration, referring to the pledge of
U.N. member states to promote universal respect for and observance of
"human rights and fundamental freedoms,"" states: 'Whereas a common
understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for
the full realization of this pledge, Now, therefore, the General Assembly Pro-
claims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights."12 The use of the words
"a common understanding of these rights and freedoms" clearly suggests that
this Declaration was intended to be declarative of and to interpret the term
"human rights and fundamental freedoms" mentioned in the U.N. Charter. 13
The Universal Declaration was adopted by the General Assembly without a
dissenting vote on 10 December 1948.14 Approximately seven months
before, on 2 May 1948, the member states of the O.A.S. signed the
respect... human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race. To
establish instead, and to enforce, distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively
based on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which constitute a denial of
fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter.
Id. See also Separate Opinion of Vice-President F. Ammoun, id. at 75-79 (discussion of
the binding nature of human rights norms).
7. Charter of the Organization of the American States, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. 2361, as
amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires of 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. 6847
[hereinafter cited as O.A.S. Charter].
8. Id. art. 3(J) (art. 5(j) in original Charter).
9. Adopted 10 December 1948; G.A. Res. 217 A (111), U.N. Doc. A/81 0, reprinted in 2 U.N.
Resolutions, ser. 1, General Assembly 135-43 (D. Djonovich, ed. 1948-49) [hereinafter
cited as Universal Declaration].
10. Adopted 2 May 1948, by the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota,
Colombia; reprinted in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Handbook of
Existing Rules Pertaining to Human Rights, O.A.S. Doc. OEAISer. L/V/I.50, doc. 6 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as American Declaration].
11. Universal Declaration, supra note 9, Protocol at 136. For a discussion of this pledge, see
supra notes 4 and 5 and accompanying text.
12. Universal Declaration, supra note 9, Protocol at 136 (italics omitted).
13. The term "human rights and fundamental freedoms" appears in article 55 of the United
Nations Charter. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
14. Forty-eight states voted in support of G.A. Res. 217 A (111), with two states absent (Hon-
duras and Yemen), and eight abstentions (Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the U.S.S.R.,
Byelorussian S.S.R., Ukrainian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia). 2 U.N.
Resolutions, ser. 1, General Assembly 29 (D. Djonovich, ed. 1948-49).
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American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.15 This document,
reflecting natural law theory, asserts that the fundamental rights of man "are
not derived from the fact that he is a national of a certain state, but are based
upon attributes of his human personality."16 It notes, moreover, that interna-
tional protection of these rights "should be the principal guide of an evolving
American law" and that the American states should "increasingly strengthen
[their regional] system in the international field as conditions become more
favorable." 17
The fact that both the U.N. and O.A.S. chose in 1948 not to fashion their
respective declarations in treaty form, which would have created binding
legal obligations, does not mean, however, that the basic rights and
freedoms proclaimed in these declarations are merely "aspirational" and
without legal effect today. On the contrary, a convincing argument can be
made that, with the passage of over thirty years since their adoption, the
Universal and American Declarations embody normative principles that
have acquired over time the status of international and regional customary
law and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. In this
connection, the U.N.'s Office of Legal Affairs made the following observa-
tion in a 1962 memorandum:
In United Nations practice, a "declaration" is a formal solemn instrument,
suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting importance are
being enunciated, such as the Declarations of Human Rights....
[A declaration] may be considered to impart on behalf of the organ adopting it,
a strong expectation that Members of the international community will abide by
it. Consequently, insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice,
a declaration may by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding
upon the States.' 8
Similarly, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, whose
function it is to investigate violations of the rights guaranteed in the
American Convention on Human Rights, 19 has taken the position in recent
years that the human rights proclaimed in the 1948 American Declaration are
15. The American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 10, was adopted
by the Ninth International Conference of American States, held at Bogota, Colombia, 30
March-2 May 1948.
16. American Declaration, supra note 10, at 19.
17. Id.
18. 34 U.N. ESCOR Supp. No. 8 at 15, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/L.604 (1962).
19. Signed 22 November 1969, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65 rev. 1 corr. 1
(1970), entered into force 18 July 1979 [hereinafter cited as American Convention];
reprinted in Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Handbook of Existing Rules
Pertaining to Human Rights, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser. LIVIII.50, doc. 6 (1980). The
American Convention, Resolution XXIV of the Inter-American Conference on Human
Rights, was adopted by the Second Special Inter-American Conference, held in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil, 17-30 November 1965.
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part of the hemisphere's customary law and thus legally binding on all
O.A.S. member states.
Moreover, the U.S. government in its amicus brief filed with the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in the case Filartiga v. Pena 20 unequivocally
stated that certain basic human rights constitute today rules of customary
international law that are binding on all nation-states. 21 In that case, the
district court had dismissed the complaint on the assumption that the death
by torture of a foreign citizen at the hand of an agent of the same country did
not violate the law of nations as that term is used in 28 U.S.C. §1350.22 In
arguing that official torture is a violation of international law giving rise to a
judicially enforceable tort remedy in U.S. courts, the U.S. government noted
that "changing customs and standards of behavior in the international com-
munity" have "produced wide recognition that certain fundamental human
rights are now guaranteed to individuals as a matter of customary interna-
tional law." 23
While conceding that not all human rights may be judicially enforceable
since they lack the requisite degree of "specificity and universality," 24 the
government stated that "international custom ... indicates that nations have
accepted as law an obligation to observe fundamental human rights"25 and
that the obligation "has been reiterated in a growing number of more specific
multilateral treaties." 26 The government's brief also cites the International
Court of Justice's decisions in the Nuclear Test cases (Australia v. France) 27
and its Advisory Opinion on Namibia28 to confirm the existence of a
customary law of human rights. The government stated, moreover:
General principles of law recognized by civilized nations also establish that
there are certain fundamental human rights to which all individuals are entitled,
regardless of nationality. Although specific practices differ widely among nations,
all nations with organized legal systems recognize constraints on the power of the
state to invade their citizens' human rights. In the period 1948-1973, the constitu-
tions or other important laws of over 75 states either expressly referred to or
20. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
21. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 5-12, Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980) ("certain fundamental human rights are now guaranteed to individuals as a
matter of customary international law').
22. Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, Civil Case No. 79-917 (E.D. N.Y., filed 6 April 1979).
23. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 9.
26. Id.
27. Australia v. France, Judgment of 20 December 1974, 1974 I.C.J. 253, 303 (Opinion of
Judge Petren), cited in Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, n. 20, Filartiga v.
Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
28. Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), 1971 l.C.J. 16, cited in Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, n. 20, Filar-
tiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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clearly borrowed from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In the same
period, the Declaration was referred to in at least 16 cases in domestic courts of
various nations.
The decisions of the International Court of Justice also reflect and confirm the
existence of a customary international law of human rights .... In sum, as the
Department of State said in a recent report to Congress on human rights prac-
tices:
There now exists an international consensus that recognizes basic human rights and
obligations owed by all governments to their citizens.... There is no doubt that these
rights are often violated; but virtually all governments acknowledge their validity.29
The coincidence of views of the U.N.'s legal branch and the U.S.
government, which are supported by the writings of numerous international
law experts, are strong evidence that many of the principles proclaimed in
the Universal and American Declarations have crystallized into binding rules
of customary international law and principles of law recognized by nations.
Ii. BASIC RIGHTS OF ALIENS AND REFUGEES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
-Both the Universal and American Declarations proclaim certain rights and
freedoms that are relevant to aliens, in general, and to refugees, in par-
ticular.
A. The Right to Emigrate
Article 13 of the Universal Declaration expressly recognizes as a basic
human right the individual's right to emigrate. 30 Article 13(1) states that
"[e]veryone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the
borders of each state," 31 and 13(2) provides that "[e]veryone has the right to
leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." 32 The
American Declaration implicitly proclaims this right in Article 19, which
declares: "Every person has the right to the nationality to which he is entitled
by law and to change it, if he so wishes, for the nationality of any other coun-
try that is willing to grant it to him." 33
This new right to emigrate has been incorporated in various interna-
tional and regional human rights agreements which are legally binding on
contracting states parties. For example, Article 12(2) of the International
29. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 10-11 (citations omitted), Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
30. Universal Declaration, supra note 9, art. 13.
31. Id. art. 13(1).
32. Id. art. 13(2).
33. American Declaration, supra note 10, art. 19.
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights34 declares that "[elveryone shall be
free to leave any country, including his own." 3- Article 5(d)(ii) of the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 36
Article 22 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 37 and Article 2(2)
of Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 38 embody this right in almost identical
language.
It is important to note that the right to emigrate from one country does
not create an express individual right to immigrate to another country. Tradi-
tionally, international law has regarded the subject of immigration as
preeminently within the exclusive domain of a state's domestic jurisdiction,
since it was regarded as a matter concerning the self-interests of states. Thus,
in the absence of treaty obligations, a state enjoys the sovereign right to
exclude aliens from its territory. The corollary, of course, is that every state
can admit anyone it so chooses to its territory. It was only when aliens were
admitted to the territory of another state that customary international law
sought to protect them and, in particular, their property from arbitrary and
discriminatory action by the admitting state. Actual state practice over the
past two centuries has exhibited a clear disinclination on the part of many
states to exercise this exclusionary power. States have chosen to admit large
numbers of aliens into their territory, albeit often on a discriminatory basis;
and, motivated by humanitarian considerations, have granted refuge to cer-
tain classes of aliens fleeing from persecution. Reflecting this state practice
and responding to a series of worldwide refugee crises since 1945, the inter-
national community, in connection with its efforts to promote and advance
human rights, has sought to accord a greater degree of legal protection to
refugees. This has been achieved by the inclusion, as in the case of the right
to emigrate, of the right to territorial asylum and the principle of non-
refoulement (nonreturn of a refugee to a country where he has good reason
to fear persecution) in numerous international and regional human rights
documents and conventions. 39
34. Opened for signature 19 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976; G.A. Res.
2200 A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
35. Id. art. 12(2). Article 12(4) provides: "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to
enter his own country."
36. Opened for signature 7 March 1966, entered into force 4 January 1969; 660 U.N.T.S.
195 (1969); G.A. Res. 2106 A (XX), 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 4 at 47-51, U.N. Doc.
A/6014 (1965).
Article 5(d)(ii) provides that all states parties undertake to eliminate racial discrimina-
tion in the enjoyment of "the right to leave any country, including one's own, and to
return to one's country."
37. American Convention, supra note 19, art. 22. Article 22(2) provides: "Every person has
the right to leave any country freely, including his own."
38. Opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953; 213
U.N.T.S. 222; reprinted in Council of Europe, Collected Texts, §1, doc. 5 (1971). Article
2(2) provides: "Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own."
39. For a discussion of the principle of non-refoulement, see infra notes 66-83 and accom-
panying text.
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B. The Right to Asylum
The principle of asylum is crucial both to those seeking and to those already
given refugee status. The Institute of International Law adopted in 1950 the
following broad definition of asylum: "Asylum is the protection which a State
grants on its territory or in some other place under the control of its organs,
to a person who comes to seek it." 4° This definition encompasses both
diplomatic and territorial asylum. Yet there is an important distinction
between these two kinds of asylum. Diplomatic asylum occurs when a per-
son seeks and is granted asylum in a legation, in an embassy, or on board a
naval ship or military vessel lying withing the territorial jurisdiction of the
state from which the person seeks refuge. Territorial asylum occurs when a
person reaches or crosses the frontier of another state or when that person is
already in another state and seeks and receives refuge therein. Of the two,
territorial asylum is most directly relevant to aliens and refugees.
The origins of asylum date back to the right of sanctuary in ancient
Greece and similar practices in imperial Rome and early Christian civiliza-
tion. Neither form of asylum is compelled by international law, but rather is
based on a state's recognition of a compelling humanitarian duty. Although
it is arguable that the principle of territorial asylum, based on established
tradition, has acquired the status of customary law in Latin America, it has
not yet achieved the status of a universally accepted legal right. However,
the right of an individual "to seek" asylum is set forth in several international
human rights instruments.
Article 14 of the Universal Declaration proclaims that "[e]veryone has
the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution." 41
The right cannot be invoked, however, "in the case of prosecutions genu-
inely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes
and principles of the United Nations." 42 This right is similarly enumerated in
Article 27 of the American Declaration, which states: "Every person has the
right, in case of pursuit not resulting from ordinary crimes, to seek and
receive asylum in foreign territory, in accordance with the laws of each
country and with international agreements." 43 Further, the right to territorial
asylum is made a binding legal obligation in Article 22(7) of the American
Convention on Human Rights, which provides: "Every person has the right
to seek and be granted asylum in a foreign territory, in accordance with the
legislation of the state and international conventions, in the event he is being
pursued for political offenses or related common crimes." 44 Proposals for the
inclusion of similar provisions in the two International Covenants were
40. I Annuaire de I'Institut de Droit International, art. 1 at 167 (1950).
41. Universal Declaration, supra note 9, art. 14(1).
42. Id. art. 14(2).
43. American Declaration, supra note 10, art. 27.
44. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 19, art. 22(7).
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rejected "partly because of the difficulty of reaching agreement on the
categories of persons who should be granted asylum." 45
In 1951 the U.N. General Assembly took two major actions designed to
provide greater protection to and to enlarge the rights of refugees -the crea-
tion of the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner For Refugees 46
(U.N.H.C.R.) and the adoption of the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees. 47 The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol 48 thereto provide
the most comprehensive codification of the rights of refugees under interna-
tional law. Article 1 of the 1951 Convention defines a refugee as any person
who, "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality [or having no nationality,
the country of his residence] and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwill-
ing to avail himself of the protection of that country .. .." 49 As the U.N. itself
notes, "the Convention is based upon two principles: (1) that there should be
as little discrimination as possible between nationals, on the one hand, and
refugees, on the other; and (2) that there should be no discrimination based
on race, religion or country or origin among refugees."5 0
Contracting parties to the Convention agree to accord refugees treat-
ment at least as favorable as that granted to their own citizens regarding the
exercise of basic rights, such as freedom of association,-" access to the
courts,5 2 elementary education,5 3 and public assistance.5 4 Article 31 pro-
45. United Nations, The United Nations and Human Rights at 58 (1978).
46. Statute of the Office of U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, adopted 14 December
1950; G.A. Res. 428 (V), 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. All 775; reprinted in 3
U.N. Resolutions, ser. 1, General Assembly 120-22 (D. Djonovich, ed. 1950-52). The
U.N.H.C.R.'s major responsibilities in protecting refugees include: (1) promoting govern-
mental and private efforts to promote voluntary repatriation or assimilation of refugees
within new countries; (2) facilitating the admission of refugees to states; (3) assisting
refugees to transfer their assets during and after resettlement; (4) promoting ratification of
and state compliance with international agreements for the protection of refugees; and
(5) working with governments to improve the situation of refugees and to reduce the
number requiring protection.
47. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force
21 April 1954; 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (1951) [hereinafter cited as 1951 Convention]. Adoption
was by the U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless
Persons, convened under G.A. Res. 429 (V), 14 December 1950.
48. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967,
entered into force 4 October 1967; 606 U.N.T.S. 268 [hereinafter cited as 1967
Protocol]. The 1951 Convention applied only to persons who became refugees before 1
January 1951. The 1967 Protocol removed this limitation, and afforded the protection of
the Convention to all refugees, without geographic or time limitations. The United States
signed and ratified the 1967 Protocol (it had not signed the 1951 Convention), which
entered into force as to the U.S. on 1 November 1968. See 19 U.S.T. 6223.
49. 1951 Convention, supra note 47, art. 1(A)(2).
50. United Nations, The United Nations and Human Rights at 57 (1978).
51. 1951 Convention, supra note 47, art. 15.
52. Id. art. 16.
53. Id. art. 22(1).
54. Id. art. 23.
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vides the following safeguard to aliens who have surreptitiously entered the
territory of a state party to the Convention:
The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry
or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or
freedom was threatened ... enter or are present in their territory without
authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities
and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.55
In 1954, certain member states of the O.A.S. signed at the Tenth Inter-
American Conference, held in Caracas, Venezuela, the Convention on Ter-
ritorial Asylum, 6 unquestionably the most advanced regional document of
its kind. Article 1 states: "Every State has the right, in the exercise of its
sovereignty, to admit into its territory such persons as it deems advisable,
without, through the exercise of this right, giving rise to complaint by any
other state."- 7 Under Article 2, this right of admission extends to persons
who in their country "are persecuted for their beliefs, opinions or political
affiliations, or for acts which may be considered as political offenses."5 8
Article 5 specifically provides that the mere fact "that a person has
entered into the territorial jurisdiction of a State surreptitiously or irregularly
does not affect the provision of this Convention." 59 By not excluding such
persons from the enjoyment of guaranteed rights, the Convention explicitly
recognizes the fact that persons fleeing from persecution are frequently
forced by circumstance to leave their country clandestinely and to seek
refuge in another by similar means.
In 1967 the U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted and pro-
claimed the Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 60 which recognizes that the
granting of such asylum is a peaceful and humanitarian act and sets forth
principles that should guide states in granting asylum.61 In this regard, it
affirms, in part, that (1) "Asylum granted by a State, in the exercise of its
sovereignty, to persons entitled to invoke article 14 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights ... shall be respected by all other States,"6 2 (2) that
the right may not be invoked by any person who has committed "a crime
against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity," 63 and (3) that the
55. Id. art 31(1) ("Refugees Unlawfully in the Country of Refuge"). Article 31(2) provides:
"The Contracting States shall allow such refugees a reasonable period and all the
necessary facilities to obtain admission into another country."
56. Convention on Territorial Asylum, opened for signature 28 March 1954, entered into
force 29 December 1959; O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 34.
57. Id. art. 1.
58. Id. art. 2.
59. Id. art. 5.
60. Declaration on Territorial Asylum of 14 December 1967; G.A. Res. 2203 (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967).
61. Id., preface to Declaration.
62. Id. art. 1(1).
63. Id. art. 1(2).
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State granting asylum is responsible for evaluating the grounds for its grant
thereof.64 The significance of these and other provisions65 in the Declaration
is that they further clarify the minimum standards implicit in the application
of Article 14 of the Universal Declaration and, as such, should be followed
by all states, whether or not they are contracting parties to the 1951 Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees and/or the 1967 Protocol thereto.
Despite the fact that these international instruments proclaim or
guarantee the right to asylum, it is clear that the nature of this right in the
individual is, at best, imperfect and conditional. These instruments do not
purport to create a legally enforceable right in the individual to claim
asylum, but rather reaffirm the right of the state to grant asylum. They do
provide, however, significant legal safeguards and rights to persons who
have been granted asylum.
C. The Principle of Non-Refoulement
Although the right to asylum has not yet attained universal recognition, the
international community has generally accepted the principle of non-
refoulement as a binding rule.66 The classic formulation of this principle,
which prohibits the expulsion or return of a refugee to the country from
which he has fled, is found in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention:
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler') a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nation-
ality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed
by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a
danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having
been convicted by a final judgement rf a particularly serious crime, con-
stitutes a danger to the community of that country.67
64. Id. art. 1(3).
65. Id.
66. Guy Goodwin-Gill, former Legal Advisor to the U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees,
has argued that "the prohibition on the return of refugees to countries of persecution has
established itself as a general principle of international law, binding on States
automatically and independently of any specific assent." G. Goodwin-Gill, International
Law and the Movement of Persons Between States 141 (1978). Richard Plender,
however, while supporting the concept of non-refoulement, argued in his 1972 book
that it had not yet obtained the status of being a general principle of international law.
"An examination of diplomatic practice does not support the view that non-refoulement
has yet matured into a principle of international law. Nevertheless, it does demonstrate
widespread acceptance of the unwisdom of returning political refugees, against their
will, to the country from which they have fled." R. Plender, International Migration Law
244 (1972).
67. 1951 Convention, supra note 47, art. 33. ("Prohibition of Expulsion or Return ('Refoule-
ment)'.
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With regard to expulsion, article 32 provides that a refugee shall not be
expelled except on grounds of national security or public order,68 and then
only pursuant to a decision reached in accordance with due process of law,
including the right of the refugee to give evidence himself and the right of
appeal. 69 In case of expulsion, the refugee must be allowed a reasonable
period within which to seek legal admission into another country.70
The inclusion of both words "expel or return" in article 33 is significant
since "return" encompasses the case of a refugee who has arrived in or at the
frontier of a state party to the Convention. Properly viewed, the prohibition
against return should require a state party that is unwilling to grant such a
refugee asylum (who otherwise satisfies the article's requirements) to accord
him safe passage to another country or, perhaps, to expel him to another
country disposed to receive him. Moreover, not only may a state party not
directly expel a refugee to a country where he risks persecution, but simi-
larly may not expel him to another country where there is a reasonable basis
to believe that he would be returned subsequently to the country where he
fears persecution.7 1 Thus, Article 33 prohibits any direct or indirect return or
expulsion to the country of feared persecution. It is also noteworthy that
Article 33, unlike other provisions in the Convention, makes no distinction
between a refugee lawfully or unlawfully in the state party's territory. This ar-
ticle provides a crucial safeguard to refugees and, accordingly, no reserva-
tion to or derogation from it by a state party is permitted under the Conven-
tion. 72
The principle of non-refoulement is included in many of the previously
mentioned international instruments, as well as in other international and
regional conventions on asylum and extradition. The 1954 Caracas Conven-
tion on Territorial Asylum provides in Article 3 that: "No state is under the
obligation to surrender to another state or to expel from its own territory,
persons persecuted for political reasons or offenses." 73 The American Con-
68. Id. art. 32(1).
69. Id. art. 32(2). This provision applies "[elxcept where compelling reasons of national
security otherwise require .... Id.
70. Id. art. 32(3). The host state may, however, apply whatever internal measures it deems
necessary during this period.
71. Id. art. 33(1).
72. Id. art. 42(1). "At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State may make
reservations to articles of the Convention other than to articles 1, 3, 4, 16(1), 33, 36-46
inclusive." Article 33 is the only major substantive provision in the Convention to which
no exceptions are allowed, demonstrating the importance of non-refoulement to the
drafters, and the unacceptability of any lesser standard. Of the other articles to which no
reservation may be taken: Article 1 contains the definition of the term "refugee"; Article 3
is a nondiscrimination clause; Article 4 is a freedom of religion clause; Article 16(1) pro-
vides for free access to the courts; and Articles 36-46 are administrative clauses.
73. Caracas Convention on Territorial Asylum, 18 Pan-Am. T.S. Copies of all Inter-American
treaties and conventions dealing with asylum and extradition have been reprinted in
Trados y convenciones interamericanos sobre asilo y extradicion, Union Panamericana,
Serie Sobre Tratados No. 34; O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser. X/7 (Espanol). English translations of
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vention on Human Rights makes the principle of non-return a legally binding
rule on its signatories in article 22(8), which provides in language similar to
that used in the 1951 Convention: "In no case may an alien be deported or
returned to a country, regardless of whether or not it is his country of origin,
if in that country his right to life or personal freedom is in danger of being
violated because of his race, nationality, religion, social status, or political
opinions." 74 Unlike provision 6 of the same article, which pointedly applies
only to "aliens lawfully in the territory of a State Party," 75 section 8 specifi-
cally refers to "aliens" and thus makes no distinction between those aliens
lawfully within a state and those who are not for purposes of the principles
application.
The 1967 U.N. Declaration on Territorial Asylum contains an important
provision on non-refoulement. Article 3 declares that: "No person [entitled
to invoke Article 14 of the Universal Declaration] shall be subjected to
measures such as rejection at the frontier or, if he has already entered the ter-
ritory in which he seeks asylum, expulsion or compulsory return to any State
where he may be subjected to persecution." 76 This protection applies to all
persons except "in the case of prosecution genuinely arising from non-
political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the
United Nations."77 It should be noted that Article 3's proscription against
refoulement applies equally to rejection at a frontier and to return or expul-
sion of an alien who already has entered the country, whether legally or
illegally. 711
This principle is also embodied in Article 2 of the Organization of
African Unity's 1969 Convention governing the Specific Aspects of the
Refugee Problem in Africa (which specifically prohibits rejection at the fron-
tier),79 in Article 3 of the Nansen Convention relating to the International
the treaties and conventions are available in Inter-American Treaties and Conventions on
Asylum and Extradition, Pan-American Union, Treaty Series No. 34, O.A.S. Doc.
OEA/Ser. X/I (English).
74. American Convention, supra note 19, art. 22(8).
75. Id. art. 22(6) (emphasis added).
76. U.N. Declaration on Territorial Asylum, supra note 60, art. 3(1) (emphasis added).
77. Id., preface to Declaration (quoting Article 14 of the Universal Declaration).
78. Unlike the American Convention, the Declaration on Territorial Asylum does not allow
for exceptions to the non-refoulement provision. Article 3(2) of the Declaration provides,
however, that an exception "may be made ... only for overriding reasons of national
security or in order to safeguard the population, as in the case of a mass influx of
people." Declaration on Territorial Asylum, supra note 60, art. 3(2). Article 3(3) provides
that should a state decide to make an exception to Article 1 (1), it should consider grant-
ing the individual an opportunity, through provisional asylum or otherwise, of going to
another state.
79. O.A.U. Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Addis
Ababa, opened for signature 10 September 1969, entered into force 20 June 1974;
reprinted in International Legal Instruments on Refugees in Africa 118 (G. Melander & P.
Nobel eds. 1979). Article 2(3) provides: "No person shall be subjected by a Member
State to measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion, which would
compel him to return to or remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity or liberty
would be threatened ......
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Status of Refugees (Geneva 1933),80 in Article 31 of the Final Act of the 1954
U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries, which adopted the Convention
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons,81 in Article 3 of the European Con-
vention on Extradition (1957),82 and in Article 3 of the legal principles gov-
erning the treatment of refugees adopted by the Asian-African Legal Con-
sultative Committee in Bangkok in 1966.83
It is abundantly clear that the inclusion of the principle of non-
refoulement in both international and regional treaties, which impose legal
obligations on signatories thereto, and in important declarations indicates
that the principle has received widespread authoritative recognition
throughout the world. As such, it appears that this principle has evolved
from a basic humanitarian duty into a general principle of international law
that binds all states, even in the absence of an express treaty obligation.
D. Rights Conferred by the Helsinki Accords
The United States and thirty-four other countries, including the state
members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, signed on 1 August 1975 the Final
Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 84 Commonly
known as the Helsinki Accords, this instrument is an agreement among the
signatory states, elaborated in treaty language without being a treaty.85
Although the Accords do not create legally binding obligations, they
nonetheless, according to Judge Thomas Buergenthal and other leading
authorities, "must be interpreted by reference to relevant principles of inter-
80. Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees, signed at Geneva 28
October 1933; 159 L.N.T.S. 199. Article 3 provides that a contracting state is "not to
remove or keep from its territory by application of police measures, such as expulsions
or non-admittance at the frontier (refoulement), refugees .... "
81. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, adopted 28 September 1954 by a
Conference of Plenipotentiaries convened by ECOSOC Res. 526 A (XVII), 26 April 1954;
360 U.N.T.S. 117. Article 31(1) provides: "The Contracting States shall not expel a
stateless person lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public
order."
82. European Convention on Extradition, 24 E.T.S.; 359 U.N.T.S. 273. Article 3(2) prohibits
extradition where there is reason to believe that the request was made "for the purpose
of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality or
political opinion, or that that person's position may be prejudiced for any of these
reasons."
83. Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, Principles Concerning Treatment of
Refugees, adopted in Bangkok 8-17 August 1966; reprinted in International Legal Instru-
ments on Refugees in Africa, supra note 79, at 374-83. Article 3(3) provides:
No one seeking asylum ... should [except for reasons of national security] be subjected to
measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion which would result in compelling
him to return to or remain in a territory if there is a well-founded fear of persecution endangering
his life, physical integrity or liberty in that territory.
84. 73 U.S. Dep't of State Bull. 323; reprinted in 14 Int'l Legal Mat. 1292 (1975).
85. See Buergenthal, "International Human Rights Law and the Helsinki Final Act: Conclu-
sions," Human Rights, International Law and the Helsinki Accord 3-4 (T. Buergenthal ed.
1977).
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national law .... By incorporating and invoking preexisting principles of
international law, the Helsinki Final Act confirms the adherence of the par-
ticipating states to these principles and strengthens them to that extent."8 6 In
this regard, the Final Act contains specific human rights provisions in Princi-
ple 7 of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Par-
ticipating States87 and in Basket III, entitled Cooperation in Humanitarian
and Other Fields.
Principle 7 declares that "[tihe participating States will respect human
rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, con-
science, religion or beliefs, for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language or religion" and "will promote and encourage the effective exercise
of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and
freedoms." 8 8 Further, signatory states "confirm the right of the individual to
know and act upon his rights and duties" and pledge to act "in conformity
with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Participating states are also
bound to "fulfill their obligations as set forth in the international declarations
and agreements in this field, including inter alia the International Covenants
on Human Rights, by which they may be bound." Judge Buergenthal notes:
"General Principle VII was acknowleged to be a statement of fundamental
normative importance because it incorporates by reference a vast body of
existing conventional and customary international human rights law and
contains the undertaking of the signatory states to abide by this law."89
Moreover, the reference specifically to the Universal Declaration tends to
confirm the view that the basic right proclaimed therein has achieved the
status of customary international law.
The human rights provision in Basket III are narrower and more specific
in scope than those in Principle 7. The first section of Basket III declares the
goal of signatory states "to facilitate freer movement and contacts, individ-
ually and collectively, whether privately or officially, among persons, institu-
tions and organizations of the participating States, and to contribute to the
solution of the humanitarian problems that arise in that connexion." 90
Included among the practical measures in Basket III to be complemented
by appropriate domestic legislation are: (1) facilitation of travel by members
86. Id. at 6.
87. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, supra note 84, at
1295 ("Questions Relating to Security in Europe; (a) Declaration on Principles Guiding
Relations between Participating States; VII. Respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief').
88. Id. at 1313.
89. Buergenthal, supra note 85, at 8.
90. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, supra note 84, at
1313 (Basket III) ("Co-Operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields, §1 'Human
Contacts,' para. 5").
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of families in different countries;91 (2) reunification of family members by
permitting emigration from the state of departure and immigration to the
receiving state with "appropriate care with regard to employment for per-
sons from other participating States who take up permanent residence in
that State ... [and assurance] that they are afforded opportunities equal to
those enjoyed by [signatories] own citizens for education, medical
assistance and social security";92 (3) grant of exit or entry permits to persons
"who have decided to marry a citizen from another participating State"; 93 (4)
facilitation of travel for personal and professional reasons;94 (5) promotion of
tourism; 95 (6) encouragement of meetings among young people through
educational exchanges, professional training, foreign language study, and
youth programs; 96 (7) expansion of sports meetings and competition;97 and
(8) exchange of information in all fields of knowledge. 98
It is noteworthy that, although not stated as rights, emigration and immi-
gration in the context of family reunification and the granting of exit and
entry permits to facilitate transnational marriages are specific goals the
signatory states have agreed in Principle 7 to promote and implement.
Although emigration and immigration are not mentioned in Principle 7, the
right to emigrate, as previously noted, and other basic freedoms relevant to
refugees and aliens arguably are incorporated by reference in Principle 7
since these basic rights are enumerated in the Universal Declaration and in
other related international declarations and agreements. 99
III. UNITED STATES COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
STANDARDS RELATING TO ALIENS AND REFUGEES
Prior to assessing the compatibility of existing United States immigration and
related laws with relevant international law standards, it is important to note
that, despite the fact that this country helped draft and has ratified the U.N.
and O.A.S. charters, supported and voted for the Universal and Inter-
American Human Rights Declarations, and has been the leading spokesman
for human rights around the world, the United States has one of the worst
91. Id. at 1313. ("1. Human Contacts, (1)(a) Contacts and Regular Meetings on the Basis of
Family Ties").
92. Id. at 1314 ("(1)(b) Reunification of Families).
93. Id. at 1314 ("(1)(c) Marriage between Citizens of Different States).
94. Id. at 1314 ('(1)(d) Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons).
95. Id. at 1315 ("(1)(e) Improvement of Conditions for Tourism on an Individual or Collective
Basis').
96. Id. at 1315 ("(1)(f) Meetings among Young People").
97. Id. at 1315 ("(1)(g) Sport").
98. Id. at 1315 ("(1)(2) Information').
99. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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records in the world for ratification of international human rights
agreements. 00
A. United States Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties
To date, the United States has ratified only the 1967 Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees; the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of
Slavery, the Salve Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery;
and the Slavery Convention of 1926, amended by the 1953 Protocol.
However, the United States has signed, but the Senate has not given its
advice and consent to, the following international agreements: the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (signed
1948), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion (signed 1966), and the American Convention on Human Rights, the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, all signed by President Jimmy Carter in 1977.
Apart from ratifying the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and
signing the 1928 Havana Convention on Asylum, the United States has
neither signed nor ratified any other regional or international convention
affording explicit protections to refugees. In fact, when signing the 1928
Havana Convention on Asylum, 1 1 the United States delegation did so with
an explicit reservation which declared that the United States "does not
recognize or subscribe to as part of international law, the so called doctrine
of asylum." 102
This poor record of ratification does not mean, however, that the basic
human rights and freedoms guaranteed or proclaimed in these instruments
do not apply to or have legal consequences for the United States and other
states that are not parties to them. As previously noted, certain basic human
rights and freedoms, once having attained a sufficient degree of universal
recognition, have become rules of customary international law or general
principles of law that are legally binding on all states. The U.S. government
has explicitly accepted this view in its amicus brief in the Filartiga case. 10 3
Moreover, the very fact that the United States has signed but not ratified cer-
tain conventions also creates certain legal obligations. Under an
authoritative principle of treaty law, a state, on signing a treaty, is obliged to
refrain from acts which could defeat the object and purpose of the treaty un-
til that state makes clear its intention not to become a party to it.104
100. For a discussion of the U.S. record in ratification of international human rights
agreements, see U.S. Ratification of the Human Rights Treaties. (R. Lillich ed. 1981).
101. 4 M. Hudson, International Legislation 2412-15 (1931).
102. Id. at 2415.
103. See supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
104. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done at Vienna 22 May 1969, opened for
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B. United States Immigration and Refugee Legislation
The entry of aliens and refugees to and their exclusion from the United
States are governed by the Immigration and Nationality Act' 05 and the
Refugee Act of 1980.106 Both laws are obligations assumed beyond the inter-
national law principle that a state has an absolute right to exclude aliens
from its territory. The criteria for admission and exclusion of aliens set forth
in these acts are therefore beyond the scrutiny of international law, pro-
vided, however, that these criteria, either on their face or as applied, do not
violate specific rules of international law that are binding on the United States.
1. The Immigration and Nationality Act. Sections 212(a)(27), (28) and
(29) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which provide for the exclusion
of certain classes of aliens from the United States solely on ideological
grounds, have been assailed as inconsistent with the spirit, if not the rules, of
international law in this area. Section 212(a)(27) of the Act excludes aliens
"who the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reason to
believe seek to enter the United States solely, principally, or incidentally to
engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest, or
endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States." 107 Section
212(a)(28) mandates the exclusion of aliens who are anarchists, who are in
any way affiliated with the communist party, who advocate the doctrines of
communism or the establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dic-
tatorship, or who advocate "the overthrow by force, violence, or other
unconstitutional means of the Government of the United States." 108
This section also excludes aliens who "write or publish, or cause to be
written or published, or who knowingly circulate distribute, print, or
display ... or have in their possession.., any written or printed matter,
advocating or teaching opposition to all organized government, or advo-
cating or teaching... the economic, international, and governmental doc-
trines of world communism."1 09 Section 212(a)(29) excludes aliens
whom the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reasonable
ground to believe probably would, after entry, (A) engage in activities which
would be prohibited by the laws of the United States relating to espionage,
sabotage, public disorder, or in other activity subversive to the national security,
signature 23 May 1969; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39127 (1969), art. 18(a); reprinted in 63 Am.
1. Intl L. 875-903 (1969) ("Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty
prior to its entry into force").
105. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified in 8 U.S.C. §§1101-1254) (also referred
to as the McCarran-Walter Act) [hereinafter cited as INA].
106. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified in 8 U.S.C. §§1101-1254) [hereinafter
cited as Refugee Act of 1980].
107. INA, supra note 105, §212(a)(27) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §1 182(a)(27) (1976)).
108. Id. §212(a)(28) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(28) (1976)).
109. Id. §212(a)(28)(G) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(28)(G) (1976)).
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(B) engage in any activity a purpose of which is the opposition to, or the control
or overthrow of, the Government of the United States, by force, violence, or
other unconstitutional means, or (C) ... participate in the activities of any
organization which is ... required to be registered under section 7 of the
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.110
While the attorney general or the secretary of state on the consular offi-
cial's recommendation may waive the exclusionary grounds provided in sec-
tion 212(a)(28), 1"1 neither he nor the secretary of state is empowered to
recommend or approve such a waiver for aliens covered by section
212(a)(27) and (29).112
2. McGovern Amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act. In
August 1977 the Congress, citing the need for greater U.S. compliance with
the provisions of the Helsinki Accords, passed the McGovern Amendment,
which significantly liberalized waiver grants under section 212(a)(28).1 13
The Amendment authorizes the secretary of state to recommend that
the attorney general grant a waiver to an alien who is excludable because of
membership in a proscribed organization, "unless the Secretary [of State]
determines that the admission of such alien would be contrary to the secu-
rity interests of the United States and so certifies to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate." 114 The Congress modified the McGovern Amendment in
1979 to prohibit the application of the liberalized waiver provisions to
members or representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and
members of labor organizations that in fact are "instruments of a totalitarian
state," and to permit the secretary of state to refuse to recommend waivers
for "aliens from signatory countries which are not in substantial compliance
with the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, particularly the human rights
and humanitarian affairs provisions." 1 S David Carliner, a noted immigration
law authority, has stated that while "lt]he effect of the McGovern Amend-
ment was to remove some of the previous barriers to admission of aliens
who had been denied visas on political grounds," the state department has
avoided in certain cases "application of the provision in Section 212(a)(28) of
the Amendment which required certification to Congress whenever a waiver
was not recommended, however. They simply barred admission of aliens
110. Id. §212(a)(29) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(29) (1976)).
111. Id. §212(d)(3) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §1182(d)(3) (1976)). See also id. §212(a)(28)()
(codified at 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(28)(1) (1976)).
112. Id. §212(d)(3) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §1182(d)(3) (1976)).
113. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-105, §112, 91 Stat.
848 (1977).
114. Id. (subsequently amended; see infra note 117 and accompanying text).
115. Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-60,
§109, 93 Stat. 397 (1979).
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under other provisions of the statute, namely Section 212(a)(27) or, in rare
cases, Section 212(a)(29)."116
Carliner charges that the current United States visa policy, insofar as
aliens continue to be excluded under sections 212(a)(27), (28), and (29), fails
to comply with this country's undertakings as a signatory to the Helsinki Final
Act, particularly those provisions of Basket III on Cooperation in
Humanitarian and Other Fields. 117 Regarding Basket III provisions concern-
ing family ties and family reunification, Carliner notes:
The provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act which require exclusion
of persons who are members of prescribed [sic] organizations do not permit
waiver for spouses, children, or parents of United States citizens. The only
grounds that a person who has been a member of a prescribed [sic] organization
can assert for seeking admission to the United States as a permanent resident are
that:
(1) such membership was involuntary," while under the age of sixteen, by
operation of law, or for the purpose of obtaining employment, food rations, or
other essentials of living; or
(2) membership was terminated at least five years prior to the date of applica-
tion for an immigrant visa and, in addition, he or she actively opposes the doc-
trines of the organization.
Persons who are able to establish these conditions, "to the satisfaction of a con-
sular officer," must also obtain a determination by the Attorney General that their
admission to the United States would be "in the public interest.' Needless to say,
these requirements exalt political doctrine above the principle of family reunifi-
cation.""
Carliner similarly perceives the anomaly between United States rhetoric
and practice in facilitating marriage between citizens of different states, pro-
vided for in Basket III. United States condemnation of the Soviet Union's
refusal to permit Russian fiances and spouses to emigrate, he notes, "is
matched by the statute which forbids the admission to this country of
spouses who have been voluntary members of proscribed organizations
unless they have been engaged in active opposition to the doctrines of such
organizations for a period of at least five years."" 9
It is important to note, in connection with Carliner's observations, that
United States failure to comply with specific human rights provisions of the
Helsinki Final Act does not constitute a violation of international law since
the Final Act is not legally binding on signatory states.' 20 However, if one
accepts the view that the Final Act incorporates by reference preexisting
116. Carliner, "United States Compliance with the Helsinki Final Act: The Treatment of
Aliens," 13 Vand. 1. Transnat'l L. 397, 402 (1980).
117. Id. at 406.
118. Id. at 407.
119. Id. at 408.
120. See Buergenthal, supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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principles of international human rights law, then this country's noncompli-
ance not only weakens the legitimacy of those principles, but similarly
diminishes the credibility of United States commitment to promote their uni-
versal observance. Despite the fact that the exclusion of aliens for
ideological and political reasons should be inimical to a democratic state
and are wholly repugnant to the principle of freedom of thought, expres-
sion, and ideas, proclaimed in virtually all international human rights instru-
ments, sections 212(a)(27), (28), and (29) do not contravene any rule of inter-
national law binding on the United States. As such, it is a permissible, albeit
unflattering, expression of a sovereign's power to exclude aliens from its ter-
ritory.
3. The Refugee Act of 1980. The Refugee Act of 1980121 is the most
significant legislative measure the Congress has undertaken to date to bring
this country's laws into conformity with basic international law principles in
the refugee area. 122 Section 201(a) of the Act amends section 101(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act by adding a new paragraph which defines
the term "refugee" in language virtually identical to that used in Article 1 of
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Pro-
tocol thereto, to which the United States is a contracting party. 123 By so
doing, the Congress has directly incorporated an international definitional
standard into U.S. law which should help reduce, in theory, the likelihood
that determinations of refugee status under the Act will be inconsistent with
this accepted international standard.
In addition, the Refugee Act eliminates some of the ideological and
geographical distinctions established in previous legislation, particularly
preferences for refugees from behind the Iron Curtain and from the Middle
East. However, the 1980 Act indicates that, in connection with the admis-
sion of refugees of "special humanitarian concern to the United States," the
121. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified in 8 U.S.C. §§1101-1254).
122. Senator Edward M. Kennedy, the original sponsor of the Refugee Act of 1980, noted in
the "Conference Report and Analysis of the Refugee Act of 1980": 'This Act gives
statutory meaning to our national commitment to human rights and humanitarian con-
cerns-which are not now reflected in our immigration law." Report of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Review of U.S. Refugee Resettlement Programs and Policies 80
(1980) (text of the "Conference Report and Analysis of the Refugee Act of 1980" trans-
mitted to the President).
123. The legislative history of the Refugee Act of 1980 indicates that it was the intention of
Congress to bring the United States into closer compliance with the 1967 Protocol. In
adopting a House version of an amendment to the 1980 Act, the Committee of the Con-
ference noted that "[t]he Conference substitute adopts the House provision with the
understanding that it is based directly upon the language of the Protocol and that it is
intended to be construed consistent with the Protocol." Joint Explanatory Statement of
the Committee of the Conference, H.R. Rep. No. 212, 96 Cong. 2d Sess. 20; reprinted in
1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 160, 161. For a thorough discussion of the legislative
history of the Refugee Act of 1980, see Anker & Posner, 19 San Diego L. Rev. 9-90
(1981).
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attorney general may not waive sections 212(a)(27), (29), and (33) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act "with respect to such an alien for
humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it otherwise would
be in the public interest." 124 Thus an alien who satisfies the Act's definitional
criteria for refugee status may nonetheless be effectively denied that status
and admission to the United States on the basis of his political convictions
and affiliations. In other words, whether or not an alien is "of special
humanitarian concern" to this country may depend on his ideology.
If, as Congress states, one of its purposes in passing the Refugee Act was
"to respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in their
homelands [by] ... humanitarian assistance for their care and maintenance
in asylum areas . ,,,125 it is difficult to understand how this purpose is
achieved by excluding such persons from entry to the United States under
provisions of section 212(a)(27) and (29). Indeed, it is arguable that the
ideological exclusion of aliens who otherwise would qualify for refugee
status under section 201 of the Act constitutes a violation of the 1967 Pro-
tocol to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees on the ground that
such exclusion is discriminatory and inconsistent with the object and pur-
pose of the 1951 Convention and the Protocol.
Section 208 of the 1980 Act authorizes the attorney general to establish
a procedure for receiving applications for asylum from "an alien physically
present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective
of such alien's status .... "126 The attorney general, at his discretion, may
grant asylum if he finds the alien to be a refugee under the definition pro-
vided in the Act. 127 A spouse or children of such an alien who is granted
asylum under this provision, if not otherwise eligible for asylum, may be
granted asylum if accompanying or following the admitted alien.12 This sec-
tion appears to be in accord with the 1967 Protocol.
The principle of non-refoulement is specifically provided for in the new
Refugee Act. Section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act has been
amended to read as follows:
(h)(1) The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien (other than an
alien described in section 241 (a)(1 9)) to a country if the Attorney General deter-
mines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on
124. See Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 106, §101(a), §207(c)(3).
125. Id. §101 (a) (statement of purpose of the Act).
126. Id. §208(a) (emphasis added).
127. Id. The term "refugee" is defined in §101 (a)(42)(A) of the 1980 Act as:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having
no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protec-
tion of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
128. Id. §208(c).
GOLDMAN & MARTIN
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any alien if the Attorney General determines
that-
(A) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the
persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion;
(B) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly
serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United States;
(C) there are serious reasons for considering that the alien has committed a
serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior to the arrival of the
alien in the United States; or
(D) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the
security of the United States.129
This language is substantially similar to that set forth in the non-
refoulement provision of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. 3 0 The inclusion of the words "deport or
return" in section 243(H)(1) of the 1980 Act should be interpreted in a man-
ner consistent with the "expel or return" phraseology of the 1951 Conven-
tion.1 3 ' In this regard, it is important to note that the prohibition by the 1951
Convention of expulsion of refugees applies equally to all aliens qualifying
for refugee status, whether they are lawfully or unlawfully in a state party's
territory.132 Accordingly, in the case of aliens who have entered the United
States surreptitiously or seek asylum at its frontiers and who otherwise would
qualify for admission as refugees, but are excluded for ideological reasons,
their expulsion or return, directly or indirectly, to a country from which they
have fled persecution would appear to violate both Article 31 and Article 33
of the 1951 Convention, both of which are binding legal obligations for the
Untied States. The United States, both before and after passage of the 1980
Refugee Act, has not always observed the principle of non-refoulement in
connection with the overall administration of its refugee and immigration
laws and policies.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A major objective of the Congress in its ongoing review and reform of
existing immigration and refugee laws and policies should be to bring these
and future laws into conformity with existing international law standards in
129. Id. §203(e) (amending INA, supra note 105, §243(h)(1)) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C.
§1253(h)(1)).
130. 1951 Convention, supra note 47, art. 33. ("Prohibition of Expulsion or Return ('Refoule-
ment}').
131. For a discussion of the "expel or return" phraseology of the 1951 Convention, see supra
notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
132. See 1951 Convention, supra note 67, art. 33 (non-refoulement provision) & art. 31
("Refugees Unlawfully in the Country of Refuge").
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the area. The National Policy Panel of the United Nations Association of the
U.S.A. in its Report of December 1979 properly observed that "[i]t is impor-
tant that the United States incorporate evolving international conceptions or
rights into its own jurisprudence, particularly as it so often urges other
governments to accept enlarged standards of human rights." 133 Since the
protection and treatment of aliens and refugees forms part of contemporary
international human rights law, the United States Senate should consent to
the principal human rights conventions signed by President Jimmy Carter in
1977, as well as other international instruments relating to aliens and
refugees. Ratification will not only dissipate the embarrassing contradiction
between our failure to formally subscribe to these conventions and our
espousal of the basic rights guaranteed therein, but will enable the United
States to participate in the organs established under these conventions to
promote, protect, and fashion regional and international human rights.
In order to achieve these goals, the United States should take the follow-
ing actions.
A. General Recommendations
1. The U.S. Senate should consent to the American Convention on Human
Rights, the Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. However, the Senate should not
effectively dilute the legal effects of its accession to these international
agreements by accepting all of the reservations, declarations, and under-
standings recommended by the U.S. state department in its letter accompa-
nying the transmittal of these treaties to the Senate. 134
2. Specifically, the Senate should reject the State Department's view that
none of the substantive provisions in these four agreements is self-executing,
i.e., not directly enforceable in U.S. courts without subsequent congres-
sional legislation.
3. The President should sign and the Senate should consent to the
Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in order for
the United States to accept the competence of the Human Rights Committee
to receive and consider petitions from persons within the United States alleg-
ing violation by the United States of any right guaranteed in the Covenant.
4. The President should propose and the Senate accede to the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, estab-
133. United Nations Association of the United States of America, United States Foreign Policy
and Human Rights at 40 (1979).
134. For a discussion of the proposed reservations to the American Convention on Human
Rights, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, and the Covenant on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, see U.S. Ratification of the Human Rights Treaties, supra note 100. The letter of
transmittal accompanying the above agreements is reprinted in id., appendix at 85.
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lished by the American Convention, to enable persons injured by the United
States to receive monetary compensation for such violations and to ensure
that such rights will not continue to be violated in the future.
B. Specific Recommendations
1. Consistent with its obligations as a party to the 1967 Optional Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees and as a signatory to the above noted four
conventions, the Congress should repeal sections 212(a)(27), (28), and (29) of
the Immigration and Naturalization Act and repeal and/or amend any sec-
tion or provision of the Refugee Act of 1980 inconsistent with its obligations
under international law.
2. With regard to individual asylum, (a) the President should sign and
the Senate approve the 1954 Caracas Convention on Territorial Asylum. (b)
The United States should press within the United Nations for a new interna-
tional convention that would strengthen an individual's right to asylum.
3. The use of the terms "refugees" and "asylum" should be standardized
in all existing and future United States legislation and patterned on United
Nations definitions to simplify application procedures and admission
guidelines for those aliens seeking refugee status or asylum within the United
States.
4. The United States should seek within the United Nations a uniform
definition of the principle of non-refoulement (no expulsion or return that
would endanger a refugee), particularly as that principle applies to territorial
asylum. In the meantime, the United States should apply that principle, as
defined in Article 33 of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and in the 1967 Protocol thereto, on a nondiscriminatory basis, to
those refugees already within United States territory and to those refugees
applying for such at its borders.
5. Pending new international conventions concerning immigration, the
United States should not refuse to grant asylum to an alien simply because
that alien has the opportunity to gain entry to another state. This principle
should apply both to individual cases and those instances involving a public
request by the U.N.H.C.R. for state support in emergencies.
6. The United States should urge, through United Nations clarification
or addenda to existing agreements or protocols, the adoption of clear inter-
national standards that prohibit, except for certain narrow grounds, extradi-
tion of refugees to their country of origin, since to do so violates the right of
free movement and asylum.
